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Basel II
The new Basel II Accord is intended to build on the 1st Basel Accord that came into operation in 1988.

Basel 1, whilst covering the main principles of risk, left certain areas uncovered and was generally a crude measure of risk. Also, the fact that the Accord is now more 15 years old means that it is largely out of date and does not take into account the new developments in the market that have taken place since its' introduction.

Although Basel II is intended to have a largely capital neutral effect overall, the intention is that capital charges will be more closely aligned with the internal group risk operations of a bank. The following are the main advantages of Basel II:

  • A more flexible, risk sensitive approach
  • Incentives for better risk management
  • Better competitive equality
  • More emphasis on a bank's own internal control, management and risk assessment
  • Encourages Market Discipline
  • A wider range of credit risk mitigation techniques

The new Basel II accord is split into 3 pillars:

  • Pillar 1 is the minimum capital requirement. This encompasses the new concept of operational risk and a new credit risk framework. The market risk framework will remain largely unchanged.
  • Pillar 2 covers supervisory review. This is intended to ensure that banks have sound internal processes to assess adequacy of capital based on risk evaluation.
  • Pillar 3 covers market discipline. Market discipline takes the form of disclosure requirements that are intended to provide information about a banks exposure to risks arising from the methodologies chosen in Pillar 1. The aim is to provide a means of disclosure between banks.

In the EU, Basel II will form the basis of CAD3 that will be the minimum legal requirement that will apply to both banks and investment firms. The new accord is expected to come into force on 1st January 2007, although this deadline has already been delayed for 12 months for the implementation of the more complex risk management-type methods, although the EU has yet to formerly agree to the proposals.

What's It All About?

STB are experts in regulatory reporting around the world and will, of course, be introducing the upgrades for Basel II to all its regulatory solutions as a standard part of the STB-Reporter service, as each regulator starts to apply the reporting changes.

This will mean that the new Basel 2 reporting requirements can be produced fully automatically, assuming that clients have adequate data and that the configuration of their systems has been adjusted. STB will produce a detailed data analysis document in each relevant country as each regulator defines their specific implementation of the Basel 2 Accord and provide advice and assistance if needed.


A Basle 2 regulatory reporting solution from STB Systems is a strategic acquisition. It helps clients develop and manage complex data and reporting requirements. As an interface between source data and reporting requirements, the system can be leveraged to deliver datafeeds, system migration, audit inspections, what-if analyses, head office, regional, branch and business unit data, comparisons, exceptions, you name it. This is a system that pays for itself.

A combination of powerful data table mapping routines, with unlimited data acquisition methodologies, upscale data management rules delivering data append and splits, and dropping of duplicated or irrelevant data, provides for an exceptional information-production system. And as for the regulatory reporting implications of Basel 2, just leave that to the experts!

Don't wait for improvements in subsystems that may never come - for more information about your business, please ask for more information about ours! Please go to our Information & Feedback link. Request a copy of STB's analysis document on Basel II.

Basel II publications from BIS

High-level principles for the cross-border implementation of the New Accord

The Basel Committee recognises that the New Accord will require more cooperation and coordination between home country and host country supervisors, especially for complex banking groups. The New Accord will accentuate the need for cooperation because the new rules will be applied at each level of the banking group, so that there is a technical requirement on the part of both home country and host country supervisors to provide a Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 assessment. In addition, there may need to be some coordination regarding Pillar 3 requirements. Consequently, the Basel Committee encourages supervisors to elaborate further on the practical implications of the Basel Concordat (see below) for the implementation of the New Accord.

Where a banking group has operations in at least one country other than the home country, the implementation of the New Accord may require it to obtain approval for its use of certain approaches from relevant host country supervisors on an individual or sub-consolidated basis, as well as from its home country supervisor in respect of consolidated supervision. The need for approval of more than one supervisor is not a precedent; the 1996 Market Risk Amendment entailed similar requirements. However, the New Accord could significantly extend the scope of such multiple approvals and is therefore likely to create some new implementation challenges.

Closer cooperation between supervisors can assist the implementation efforts of both supervisors and banking groups. There are a variety of supervisory responsibilities under the New Accord, including: (1) initial approval and validation of "advanced" approaches (eg IRB, AMA) under Pillar 1; (2) the supervisory review process under Pillar 2; and (3) ongoing assessments to verify that banking groups are applying the New Accord properly and that the conditions for "advanced" approaches continue to be met. The degree and nature of cooperation between supervisors may differ across these different supervisory responsibilities. Whatever arrangements are employed, banks have an important role to play in assisting the effective and efficient cross-border implementation efforts of supervisors.

While arrangements for cooperation among supervisors must be practical, the Basel Committee has a clear interest in implementing the New Accord in a way that strengthens the quality of bank supervision across countries. The Committee should also promote the ability of all host supervisors, and especially of those from emerging market economies, to exercise effective host banking supervision over foreign institutions operating in their jurisdictions.

The Basel Committee believes that fostering closer practical cooperation between supervisors is essential to implement the New Accord as effectively and efficiently as possible.
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs100.pdf

Principles for the home-host recognition of AMA operational risk capital

The Basel Committee is pursuing an approach to operational risk capital allocation that addresses concerns expressed by a number of organisations in their comments on CP3 about practical impediments to the cross-border implementation of an Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) for operational risk. The approach sets out how a banking organisation that calculates a group-wide AMA capital requirement might calculate the operational risk capital requirements of its subsidiaries.

While the Committee has acknowledged the need for flexibility in implementing the Accord, it is also concerned that such flexibility not undermine the Accord's fundamental objective of ensuring banks are adequately capitalised. Accordingly, the Committee is pursuing a "hybrid" approach for AMA banks under which a banking group would be permitted - subject to supervisory approval - to use a combination of stand-alone AMA calculations for significant internationally active banking subsidiaries and an allocated portion of the group-wide AMA capital requirement for its other internationally active banking subsidiaries. Under this hybrid approach, a significant internationally active banking subsidiary wishing to implement an AMA and able to meet the qualifying criteria would have to calculate its AMA capital requirements on a stand-alone basis. In calculating stand-alone AMA capital requirements, significant internationally active banking subsidiaries may incorporate a well-reasoned estimate of diversification benefits of its own operations, but may not consider group-wide diversification benefits. Where such subsidiaries are part of a group that wishes to implement an AMA on a group-wide basis, they would be permitted to utilise the resources of their parent or other appropriate entities within the group; they could rely on data and parameters calculated at the group level, for example, provided that those variables were adjusted as necessary to be consistent with the subsidiary's operations. Other internationally active subsidiaries that are not determined to be significant in the context of the overall group would be permitted - subject to supervisory approval - to use as their Pillar 1 charge for operational risk an amount that has been allocated to them from the group-wide AMA calculation.

The Basel Committee believes the following principles will be useful to guide supervisors on the implementation of this hybrid approach to the allocation of operational risk capital across home and host jurisdictions. The Committee's Accord Implementation Group (AIG) developed these principles in close coordination with the Committee's Risk Management Group.

The principles that follow are intended to be broadly compatible with the rules laid out in the Third Consultative Document. However, it is clear that specific enabling language will have to be introduced to the Accord to permit the hybrid approach within Pillar 1. To that end, the Committee is considering the text provided as an attachment to this paper.
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs106.pdf

The Application of Basel II to Trading Activities and the Treatment of Double Default Effects

The efforts of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) to revise the standards governing the capital adequacy of internationally active banks achieved a critical milestone in the publication of an agreed text in June 2004. The International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework2 describes a more comprehensive measure and minimum standard for capital adequacy that national supervisory authorities represented on the BCBS are now working to implement through domestic rule-making and adoption procedures.

The "Basel II" framework, or Revised Framework, as the new standard is frequently called, seeks to improve on the existing rules by aligning regulatory capital requirements more closely to the underlying risks that banks face. In addition, the Revised Framework is intended to promote a more forward-looking approach to capital supervision, one that encourages banks to identify the risks they may face, today and in the future, and to develop or improve their ability to manage those risks. As a result, the Revised Framework is intended to be more flexible and better able to evolve with advances in markets and risk management practices.

In releasing the Revised Framework last summer, the BCBS re-iterated its intention to maintain its active dialogue with the industry to ensure that the new framework keeps pace with, and can be applied to, ongoing developments in the financial services sector. Two areas that the BCBS identified where immediate work should be done concerned (1) finding a prudentially sound treatment under the Revised Framework for exposures to "double default," where the risk of both a borrower and a guarantor defaulting on the same obligation may be substantially lower than the risk of only one of the parties defaulting; and (2) applying the Revised Framework to certain exposures arising from trading activities.

Given the interest of both banks and securities firms in the potential solutions to these particular issues, the BCBS has worked jointly with the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) to consult with industry representatives and other supervisors on these matters. This paper describes a proposal to address five specific issues related to double default and trading activities prior to the implementation of the Revised Framework. These issues consist of the following:

  1. the treatment of counterparty credit risk for over-the-counter derivatives, repo-style and securities financing transactions; and the treatment of cross-product netting arrangements;
  2. the treatment of double-default effects for covered transactions;
  3. the short-term maturity adjustment, in the internal ratings-based approach;
  4. improvements to the current trading book regime, especially with respect to the treatment of specific risk; and
  5. the design of a specific capital treatment for failed transactions and transactions that are not settled through a delivery-versus-payment framework (non-DvP).

While this work was undertaken jointly by working groups from the BCBS and IOSCO, the resulting proposal represents an effort by the BCBS to find prudential treatments for certain exposures held by banks under the new capital standards outlined in the Revised Framework. Consequently, this text frequently refers to rules for "banks", banking groups, and other firms subject to prudential banking regulations. The BCBS recognises that, in some cases, national authorities may decide to apply these rules not just to banks and banking groups, but also to investment firms or to combined groups of banks and investment firms. In such cases, national authorities may additionally wish to apply the treatments specified in this proposal to investment firms, to groups of investment firms, and to combined groups of banks and investment firms that are subject to prudential banking or securities regulation.

The BCBS released a first version of this proposal in April 2005, for consultation purposes. Thirty-seven comments have been provided by banks, investment firms, industry associations, supervisory authorities, and other interested institutions. The BCBS and IOSCO wish to thank representatives of the industry for their fruitful comments. The BCBS and IOSCO worked diligently, in close cooperation with representatives of the industry, to reflect their comments in the present paper.
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs116.pdf

Implementation of Basel II: Practical Considerations

In June 2004, the Committee published the document "International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, a Revised Framework" (widely known as Basel II). While this revised Framework has been designed to provide options for banks and banking systems world-wide, the Committee acknowledges that moving towards its adoption in the near future may not be the first priority for all supervisors in all non-G10 countries in terms of what is needed to strengthen their supervision. Furthermore, the IMF and World Bank are of the view that future financial sector assessments will not be conducted on the basis of adoption of or compliance with the revised Framework if a country has not chosen to implement it. Rather, assessments will be based on the adequacy of the regulatory/supervisory standards adopted by the respective country and the country's performance relative to the chosen standards, consistent with the requirements of the Basel Committee's Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision ("BCP, September 1997").

Basel II aims to build on a solid foundation of prudent capital regulation, supervision, and market discipline, and to enhance further risk management and financial stability. As such, the Committee encourages each national supervisor to consider carefully the benefits of the new Framework in the context of its own domestic banking system and in developing a timetable and approach to implementation. Given resource and other constraints, these plans may extend beyond the Committee's implementation dates. That said, supervisors should consider implementing key elements of the supervisory review and market discipline components of the new Framework even if the Basel II minimum capital requirements are not fully implemented by the implementation date. National supervisors should also ensure that banks that do not implement Basel II are subject to prudent capital regulation and sound accounting and provisioning policies.

Many national supervisors who are not represented in the Committee have already begun to evaluate the suitability of the new Framework for banks in their jurisdiction and plan for the transition to Basel II. In order to further this process, the Committee convened a Working Group largely comprised of members from non-G10 countries to assess the issues involved in implementing Basel II, to help them decide whether and when to implement Basel II, and to provide practical suggestions to supervisors for the transition to the new Framework. The Working Group undertook this work during the first half of 2003. A number of those suggestions are summarised in this discussion document. Although the document has been largely informed by the experiences of the particular members of the Working Group, the guidance is not focused on any country or particular type of banking system. Rather, the document offers suggestions that can be adapted for use in different jurisdictions; it may also serve as a basis for discussion between supervisors and the banking industry. The document is not intended to be an interpretation of Basel II rules.

The document is structured as follows. Section 1 sets out various policy considerations that can play a role in weighing the costs and benefits of Basel II implementation vis-à-vis other national priorities. Section 2 discusses the factors that could be considered in determining the application of Basel II, with regard to the particular options and the population of banks which would be subject to the new Framework. Sections 3, 4 and 5 discuss implementation of Pillars 1, 2 and 3 more specifically. Sections 6 and 7 address potential changes to the legal and regulatory framework and resource and training needs.
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs109.pdf

Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market risks


This document, commonly referred to as the Market Risk Amendment, represents the main section of a three-part package of documents issued by the Basel Committee to amend the Capital Accord of July 1988 to take account of and set capital requirements for market risks. It describes two alternative approaches to the measurement of market risk, a standardised method and an internal models approach, closing with a number of worked examples. The other papers in the three-part package are an overview of the market risk amendment and a technical paper on the backtesting of models.

This document, commonly referred to as the Market Risk Amendment, represents the main section of a three-part package of documents issued by the Basel Committee to amend the Capital Accord of July 1988 to take account of and set capital requirements for market risks. It describes two alternative approaches to the measurement of market risk, a standardised method and an internal models approach, closing with a number of worked examples. The other papers in the three-part package are an overview of the market risk amendment and a technical paper on the backtesting of models.

Originally released in January 1996 and modified in September 1997, the Amendment was further revised on 14 November 2005 to incorporate the Basel Committee's 18 July 2005 paper, The application of Basel II to trading activities and the treatment of double default effects, solely as a matter of convenience to readers. This paper, which was prepared by a joint working group of the Basel Committee and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), sets forth capital requirements for banks' exposures to certain trading-related activities, including counterparty credit risk, and for the treatment of double default effects, or the risk that both a borrower and guarantor default on the same obligation. These requirements have been reflected into the appropriate sections of the Market Risk Amendment.
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs119.pdf




Solutions for Basle II regulatory reporting

Basel II publications from BIS


Guidance on the estimation of loss given default (Paragraph 468 of the Framework Document)

Following publication of "International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework" (the Basel II Framework Document) in June 2004, a number of interested parties including industry associations and national supervisors asked the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Committee) to provide further clarification surrounding the quantification of loss-given-default (LGD) parameters used for Pillar 1 capital calculations. In particular, the Committee was asked to further elaborate on the so-called "downturn LGD" standard described in paragraph 468 of the Framework Document. This paragraph requires that estimated LGD parameters must "reflect economic downturn conditions where necessary to capture the relevant risks." The same paragraph indicates that "supervisors will continue to monitor and encourage appropriate approaches to this issue." The LGD Working Group (the Working Group) was established in September 2004 to engage in a dialogue with industry concerning appropriate approaches to meeting the requirements of paragraph 468 and to determine whether it would be useful for the Committee to provide further guidance to industry and supervisors in this area.

Over the last several months, the Working Group has surveyed practitioner and academic research, national supervisors represented on the Working Group have held bilateral discussions with their banks, and the Working Group as a whole has met with a number of banks and industry associations. The following three findings have been drawn from this work. First, the potential for realised recovery rates to be lower than average during times of high default rates may be a material source of unexpected credit losses for some exposures or portfolios. Failing to account for this possibility risks understating the capital required to cover unexpected losses. Second, data limitations pose an important challenge to the estimation of LGD parameters in general, and of LGD parameters consistent with economic downturn conditions in particular. Third, there is currently little consensus within the banking industry with respect to appropriate methods for incorporating downturn conditions in LGD estimates. A significant body of academic and practitioner research on this issue has developed that shows a range of results concerning the potential impact of downturn conditions on LGDs. The extent and manner by which potential dependencies between default rates and recovery rates are reflected in internal economic capital models varies considerably across institutions.

Given these findings, the Committee has determined that a principles-based approach to elaborating on the requirements of paragraph 468 is most appropriate at this time. This approach is intended to ensure that banks have systems in place for identifying downturn conditions and for incorporating these conditions into LGD estimates where appropriate. The principles articulated in this document are designed to be flexible enough to allow for a range of sound practices and to encourage continued work in this area, while also clarifying the Committee's expectations. These principles are not intended to amend the Revised Framework or to introduce any new rules. The Committee will continue to monitor industry practice through the Accord Implementation Group and may provide additional guidance as industry practices evolve.

This document is organised into six sections. Section I defines terms used throughout this document. Section II articulates a principle for the quantification of LGD parameters consistent with paragraph 468 of the Framework Document. Section III discusses a principle for discounting recovery cash flows used in LGD estimation. Section IV discusses the possibility that for validation purposes supervisors may request that banks provide supplemental information on the average loss rate given default for some exposures. Section V provides guidance to supervisors concerning the development of fallback solutions that might be permitted on a transitional basis in circumstances where banks cannot satisfy the principle articulated in Section II. Section VI clarifies the relationship between the LGD quantification requirements in paragraph 468 and stress testing requirements discussed in paragraphs 434 and 435 of the Framework Document.
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs115.pdf




Home-host information sharing for effective Basel II implementation

This paper is being issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in association with the Core Principles Liaison Group (CPLG), a BCBS working group which includes representatives from sixteen non-BCBS jurisdictions. It addresses the question of information-sharing between home and host supervisors under the new Capital Framework known as Basel II). The paper is confined to Basel II implementation and does not address wider information sharing issues, since the implementation of Basel II is considered a priority in the short-term. However, work undertaken in the context of Basel II may help prepare the way for broader guidance in the future that addresses additional aspects of home-host cooperation, should that be considered beneficial.

The need to develop cross-border understandings on the application of capital standards to international banking groups is recognised as an essential element of the successful implementation of Basel II. In this respect, the BCBS has over the past few months been encouraging the home and host supervisors of the major international banking groups to discuss among themselves, and with the institutions that they supervise, the implementation of Basel II. These discussions have progressed to the stage where a number of preliminary decisions are being considered with regard to the ongoing supervision of individual banking groups, whether through bilateral or multilateral arrangements. It is important that these group implementation studies continue to make progress in the coming months and that home and host authorities build on the working relationships that are being developed to create effective cooperative mechanisms.

These discussions have confirmed the need to develop more robust information-sharing arrangements between home and host supervisors as set out in High-level principles for the cross-border implementation of the New Accord. Creating a framework for supervisory cooperation has been an objective of the BCBS since its creation, which it has promoted through the issue of successive principles governing cross-border supervision (starting from the 1975 Concordat) and more recently through its Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision and the subsequent Methodology. A key feature of this framework is that international banking groups need to be supervised on a consolidated basis, covering all aspects of the business, domestic and cross-border. Consolidated supervision of international banking groups requires effective co-operation and information exchange between home supervisors and host supervisors and it is hoped that improvements in this area will be one of the side-effects of Basel II.

While communication between home and host supervisors is important, banks have the primary role to play in implementing Basel II and in providing relevant information to home and host supervisors to allow them to meet their responsibilities. In particular, as is stressed in paragraph 14 of this paper, the local managers of foreign branches and subsidiaries need to be kept informed of the steps that are being taken at group level to manage group capital and of the decision to adopt one or other option under Basel II. In this regard, Basel II does not diminish the legal or governance responsibilities of subsidiary bank management within the group structure.
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs120.pdf

Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework

1. This report presents the outcome of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's ("the Committee") work over recent years to secure international convergence on revisions to supervisory regulations governing the capital adequacy of internationally active banks. Following the publication of the Committee's first round of proposals for revising the capital adequacy framework in June 1999, an extensive consultative process was set in train in all member countries and the proposals were also circulated to supervisory authorities worldwide. The Committee subsequently released additional proposals for consultation in January 2001 and April 2003 and furthermore conducted three quantitative impact studies related to its proposals. As a result of these efforts, many valuable improvements have been made to the original proposals. The present paper is now a statement of the Committee agreed by all its members. It sets out the details of the agreed Framework for measuring capital adequacy and the minimum standard to be achieved which the national supervisory authorities represented on the Committee will propose for adoption in their respective countries. This Framework and the standard it contains have been endorsed by the Central Bank Governors and Heads of Banking Supervision of the Group of Ten countries.

2. The Committee expects its members to move forward with the appropriate adoption procedures in their respective countries. In a number of instances, these procedures will include additional impact assessments of the Committee's Framework as well as further opportunities for comments by interested parties to be provided to national authorities. The Committee intends the Framework set out here to be available for implementation as of yearend 2006. However, the Committee feels that one further year of impact studies or parallel calculations will be needed for the most advanced approaches, and these therefore will be available for implementation as of year-end 2007. More details on the transition to the revised Framework and its relevance to particular approaches are set out in paragraphs 45 to 49.

3. This document is being circulated to supervisory authorities worldwide with a view to encouraging them to consider adopting this revised Framework at such time as they believe is consistent with their broader supervisory priorities. While the revised Framework has been designed to provide options for banks and banking systems worldwide, the Committee acknowledges that moving toward its adoption in the near future may not be a first priority for all non-G10 supervisory authorities in terms of what is needed to strengthen their supervision. Where this is the case, each national supervisor should consider carefully the benefits of the revised Framework in the context of its domestic banking system when developing a timetable and approach to implementation.

4. The fundamental objective of the Committee's work to revise the 1988 Accord has been to develop a framework that would further strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system while maintaining sufficient consistency that capital adequacy regulation will not be a significant source of competitive inequality among internationally active banks. The Committee believes that the revised Framework will promote the adoption of stronger risk management practices by the banking industry, and views this as one of its major benefits. The Committee notes that, in their comments on the proposals, banks and other interested parties have welcomed the concept and rationale of the three pillars (minimum capital requirements, supervisory review, and market discipline) approach on which the revised Framework is based. More generally, they have expressed support for improving capital regulation to take into account changes in banking and risk management practices while at the same time preserving the benefits of a framework that can be applied as uniformly as possible at the national level.

5. In developing the revised Framework, the Committee has sought to arrive at significantly more risk-sensitive capital requirements that are conceptually sound and at the same time pay due regard to particular features of the present supervisory and accounting systems in individual member countries. It believes that this objective has been achieved. The Committee is also retaining key elements of the 1988 capital adequacy framework, including the general requirement for banks to hold total capital equivalent to at least 8% of their risk-weighted assets; the basic structure of the 1996 Market Risk Amendment regarding the treatment of market risk; and the definition of eligible capital.

6. A significant innovation of the revised Framework is the greater use of assessments of risk provided by banks' internal systems as inputs to capital calculations. In taking this step, the Committee is also putting forward a detailed set of minimum requirements designed to ensure the integrity of these internal risk assessments. It is not the Committee's intention to dictate the form or operational detail of banks' risk management policies and practices. Each supervisor will develop a set of review procedures for ensuring that banks' systems and controls are adequate to serve as the basis for the capital calculations. Supervisors will need to exercise sound judgements when determining a bank's state of readiness, particularly during the implementation process. The Committee expects national supervisors will focus on compliance with the minimum requirements as a means of ensuring the overall integrity of a bank's ability to provide prudential inputs to the capital calculations and not as an end in itself.

7. The revised Framework provides a range of options for determining the capital requirements for credit risk and operational risk to allow banks and supervisors to select approaches that are most appropriate for their operations and their financial market infrastructure. In addition, the Framework also allows for a limited degree of national discretion in the way in which each of these options may be applied, to adapt the standards to different conditions of national markets. These features, however, will necessitate substantial efforts by national authorities to ensure sufficient consistency in application. The Committee intends to monitor and review the application of the Framework in the period ahead with a view to achieving even greater consistency. In particular, its Accord Implementation Group (AIG) was established to promote consistency in the Framework's application by encouraging supervisors to exchange information on implementation approaches.

8. The Committee has also recognised that home country supervisors have an important role in leading the enhanced cooperation between home and host country supervisors that will be required for effective implementation. The AIG is developing practical arrangements for cooperation and coordination that reduce implementation burden on banks and conserve supervisory resources. Based on the work of the AIG, and based on its interactions with supervisors and the industry, the Committee has issued general principles for the cross-border implementation of the revised Framework and more focused principles for the recognition of operational risk capital charges under advanced measurement approaches for home and host supervisors.

9. It should be stressed that the revised Framework is designed to establish minimum levels of capital for internationally active banks. As under the 1988 Accord, national authorities will be free to adopt arrangements that set higher levels of minimum capital. Moreover, they are free to put in place supplementary measures of capital adequacy for the banking organisations they charter. National authorities may use a supplementary capital measure as a way to address, for example, the potential uncertainties in the accuracy of the measure of risk exposures inherent in any capital rule or to constrain the extent to which an organisation may fund itself with debt. Where a jurisdiction employs a supplementary capital measure (such as a leverage ratio or a large exposure limit) in conjunction with the measure set forth in this Framework, in some instances the capital required under the supplementary measure may be more binding. More generally, under the second pillar, supervisors should expect banks to operate above minimum regulatory capital levels.

10. The revised Framework is more risk sensitive than the 1988 Accord, but countries where risks in the local banking market are relatively high nonetheless need to consider if banks should be required to hold additional capital over and above the Basel minimum. This is particularly the case with the more broad brush standardised approach, but, even in the case of the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach, the risk of major loss events may be higher than allowed for in this Framework.

11. The Committee also wishes to highlight the need for banks and supervisors to give appropriate attention to the second (supervisory review) and third (market discipline) pillars of the revised Framework. It is critical that the minimum capital requirements of the first pillar be accompanied by a robust implementation of the second, including efforts by banks to assess their capital adequacy and by supervisors to review such assessments. In addition, the disclosures provided under the third pillar of this Framework will be essential in ensuring that market discipline is an effective complement to the other two pillars.

12. The Committee is aware that interactions between regulatory and accounting approaches at both the national and international level can have significant consequences for the comparability of the resulting measures of capital adequacy and for the costs associated with the implementation of these approaches. The Committee believes that its decisions with respect to unexpected and expected losses represent a major step forward in this regard. The Committee and its members intend to continue playing a pro-active role in the dialogue with accounting authorities in an effort to reduce, wherever possible, inappropriate disparities between regulatory and accounting standards.

13. The revised Framework presented here reflects several significant changes relative to the Committee's most recent consultative proposal in April 2003. A number of these changes have already been described in the Committee's press statements of October 2003, January 2004 and May 2004. These include the changes in the approach to the treatment of expected losses (EL) and unexpected losses (UL) and to the treatment of securitisation exposures. In addition to these, changes in the treatments of credit risk mitigation and qualifying revolving retail exposures, among others, are also being incorporated. The Committee also has sought to clarify its expectations regarding the need for banks using the advanced IRB approach to incorporate the effects arising from economic downturns into their loss-given-default (LGD) parameters.

14. The Committee believes it is important to reiterate its objectives regarding the overall level of minimum capital requirements. These are to broadly maintain the aggregate level of such requirements, while also providing incentives to adopt the more advanced risk-sensitive approaches of the revised Framework. The Committee has confirmed the need to further review the calibration of the revised Framework prior to its implementation. Should the information available at the time of such review reveal that the Committee's objectives on overall capital would not be achieved, the Committee is prepared to take actions necessary to address the situation. In particular, and consistent with the principle that such actions should be separated from the design of the Framework itself, this would entail the application of a single scaling factor — which could be either greater than or less than one — to the IRB capital requirement resulting from the revised Framework. The current best estimate of the scaling factor using Quantitative Impact Study 3 data adjusted for the EL-UL decisions is 1.06. The final determination of any scaling factor will be based on the parallel running results, which will reflect all of the elements of the Framework to be implemented.

15. The Committee has designed the revised Framework to be a more forward-looking approach to capital adequacy supervision, one that has the capacity to evolve with time. This evolution is necessary to ensure that the Framework keeps pace with market developments and advances in risk management practices, and the Committee intends to monitor these developments and to make revisions when necessary. In this regard, the Committee has benefited greatly from its frequent interactions with industry participants and looks forward to enhanced opportunities for dialogue. The Committee also intends to keep the industry apprised of its future work agenda.

16. In July 2005, the Committee published additional guidance in the document The Application of Basel II to Treading Activities and the Treatment of Double Default Effects . That guidance was developed jointly with the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and demonstrates the capacity of the revised Framework to evolve with time. It refined the treatments of counterparty credit risk, double default effects, shortterm maturity adjustment and failed transactions, and improved the trading book regime.

17. One area where the Committee intends to undertake additional work of a longerterm nature is in relation to the definition of eligible capital. One motivation for this is the fact that the changes in the treatment of expected and unexpected losses and related changes in the treatment of provisions in the Framework set out here generally tend to reduce Tier 1 capital requirements relative to total capital requirements. Moreover, converging on a uniform international capital standard under this Framework will ultimately require the identification of an agreed set of capital instruments that are available to absorb unanticipated losses on a going-concern basis. The Committee announced its intention to review the definition of capital as a follow-up to the revised approach to Tier 1 eligibility as announced in its October 1998 press release, "Instruments eligible for inclusion in Tier 1 capital". It will explore further issues surrounding the definition of regulatory capital, but does not intend to propose changes as a result of this longer-term review prior to the implementation of the revised Framework set out in this document. In the meantime, the Committee will continue its efforts to ensure the consistent application of its 1998 decisions regarding the composition of regulatory capital across jurisdictions.

18. The Committee also seeks to continue to engage the banking industry in a discussion of prevailing risk management practices, including those practices aiming to produce quantified measures of risk and economic capital. Over the last decade, a number of banking organisations have invested resources in modelling the credit risk arising from their significant business operations. Such models are intended to assist banks in quantifying, aggregating and managing credit risk across geographic and product lines. While the Framework presented in this document stops short of allowing the results of such credit risk models to be used for regulatory capital purposes, the Committee recognises the importance of continued active dialogue regarding both the performance of such models and their comparability across banks. Moreover, the Committee believes that a successful implementation of the revised Framework will provide banks and supervisors with critical experience necessary to address such challenges. The Committee understands that the IRB approach represents a point on the continuum between purely regulatory measures of credit risk and an approach that builds more fully on internal credit risk models. In principle, further movements along that continuum are foreseeable, subject to an ability to address adequately concerns about reliability, comparability, validation, and competitive equity. In the meantime, the Committee believes that additional attention to the results of internal credit risk models in the supervisory review process and in banks' disclosures will be highly beneficial for the accumulation of information on the relevant issues.

19. This document is divided into four parts as illustrated in the following chart. The first part, scope of application, details how the capital requirements are to be applied within a banking group. Calculation of the minimum capital requirements for credit risk and operational risk, as well as certain trading book issues are provided in part two. The third and fourth parts outline expectations concerning supervisory review and market discipline, respectively.

19(i). This updated version of the revised Framework, which was initially released in June 2004, incorporates the additional guidance set forth in the Committee's paper The Application of Basel II to Trading Activities and the Treatment of Double Default Effects (July 2005). The Amendment to the Capital Accord to incorporate Market Risks (January 1996) has also been updated to reflect the changes introduced by the revised Framework and the above-mentioned document.
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs118.pdf





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