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Basel II The new Basel II Accord is
intended to build on the 1st Basel Accord that came into operation in 1988.
Basel 1, whilst covering the main principles
of risk, left certain areas uncovered and was generally a crude measure of risk.
Also, the fact that the Accord is now more 15 years old means that it is largely
out of date and does not take into account the new developments in the market
that have taken place since its' introduction. Although Basel
II is intended to have a largely capital neutral effect overall, the intention
is that capital charges will be more closely aligned with the internal group risk
operations of a bank. The following are the main advantages of Basel II:
- A
more flexible, risk sensitive approach
- Incentives
for better risk management
- Better
competitive equality
- More
emphasis on a bank's own internal control, management and risk assessment
- Encourages
Market Discipline
- A
wider range of credit risk mitigation techniques
The
new Basel II accord is split into 3 pillars:
-
Pillar
1 is the minimum capital requirement. This encompasses the new concept of operational
risk and a new credit risk framework. The market risk framework will remain largely
unchanged. -
Pillar
2 covers supervisory review. This is intended to ensure that banks have sound
internal processes to assess adequacy of capital based on risk evaluation.
-
Pillar
3 covers market discipline. Market discipline takes the form of disclosure requirements
that are intended to provide information about a banks exposure to risks arising
from the methodologies chosen in Pillar 1. The aim is to provide a means of disclosure
between banks. In
the EU, Basel II will form the basis of CAD3 that will be
the minimum legal requirement that will apply to both banks and investment firms.
The new accord is expected to come into force on 1st January 2007, although this
deadline has already been delayed for 12 months for the implementation of the
more complex risk management-type methods, although the EU has yet to formerly
agree to the proposals. What's It All About? STB
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High-level principles for the cross-border
implementation of the New Accord The
Basel Committee recognises that the New Accord will require more cooperation and
coordination between home country and host country supervisors, especially for
complex banking groups. The New Accord will accentuate the need for cooperation
because the new rules will be applied at each level of the banking group, so that
there is a technical requirement on the part of both home country and host country
supervisors to provide a Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 assessment. In addition, there
may need to be some coordination regarding Pillar 3 requirements. Consequently,
the Basel Committee encourages supervisors to elaborate further on the practical
implications of the Basel Concordat (see below) for the implementation of the
New Accord.
Where a banking group has operations in at least one country
other than the home country, the implementation of the New Accord may require
it to obtain approval for its use of certain approaches from relevant host country
supervisors on an individual or sub-consolidated basis, as well as from its home
country supervisor in respect of consolidated supervision. The need for approval
of more than one supervisor is not a precedent; the 1996 Market Risk Amendment
entailed similar requirements. However, the New Accord could significantly extend
the scope of such multiple approvals and is therefore likely to create some new
implementation challenges.
Closer cooperation between supervisors can assist
the implementation efforts of both supervisors and banking groups. There are a
variety of supervisory responsibilities under the New Accord, including: (1) initial
approval and validation of "advanced" approaches (eg IRB, AMA) under Pillar 1;
(2) the supervisory review process under Pillar 2; and (3) ongoing assessments
to verify that banking groups are applying the New Accord properly and that the
conditions for "advanced" approaches continue to be met. The degree and nature
of cooperation between supervisors may differ across these different supervisory
responsibilities. Whatever arrangements are employed, banks have an important
role to play in assisting the effective and efficient cross-border implementation
efforts of supervisors.
While arrangements for cooperation among supervisors
must be practical, the Basel Committee has a clear interest in implementing the
New Accord in a way that strengthens the quality of bank supervision across countries.
The Committee should also promote the ability of all host supervisors, and especially
of those from emerging market economies, to exercise effective host banking supervision
over foreign institutions operating in their jurisdictions.
The Basel Committee
believes that fostering closer practical cooperation between supervisors is essential
to implement the New Accord as effectively and efficiently as possible. http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs100.pdf Principles for the home-host recognition of AMA operational
risk capital The
Basel Committee is pursuing an approach to operational risk capital allocation
that addresses concerns expressed by a number of organisations in their comments
on CP3 about practical impediments to the cross-border implementation of an Advanced
Measurement Approach (AMA) for operational risk. The approach sets out how a banking
organisation that calculates a group-wide AMA capital requirement might calculate
the operational risk capital requirements of its subsidiaries.
While the
Committee has acknowledged the need for flexibility in implementing the Accord,
it is also concerned that such flexibility not undermine the Accord's fundamental
objective of ensuring banks are adequately capitalised. Accordingly, the Committee
is pursuing a "hybrid" approach for AMA banks under which a banking group would
be permitted - subject to supervisory approval - to use a combination of stand-alone
AMA calculations for significant internationally active banking subsidiaries and
an allocated portion of the group-wide AMA capital requirement for its other internationally
active banking subsidiaries. Under this hybrid approach, a significant internationally
active banking subsidiary wishing to implement an AMA and able to meet the qualifying
criteria would have to calculate its AMA capital requirements on a stand-alone
basis. In calculating stand-alone AMA capital requirements, significant internationally
active banking subsidiaries may incorporate a well-reasoned estimate of diversification
benefits of its own operations, but may not consider group-wide diversification
benefits. Where such subsidiaries are part of a group that wishes to implement
an AMA on a group-wide basis, they would be permitted to utilise the resources
of their parent or other appropriate entities within the group; they could rely
on data and parameters calculated at the group level, for example, provided that
those variables were adjusted as necessary to be consistent with the subsidiary's
operations. Other internationally active subsidiaries that are not determined
to be significant in the context of the overall group would be permitted - subject
to supervisory approval - to use as their Pillar 1 charge for operational risk
an amount that has been allocated to them from the group-wide AMA calculation.
The
Basel Committee believes the following principles will be useful to guide supervisors
on the implementation of this hybrid approach to the allocation of operational
risk capital across home and host jurisdictions. The Committee's Accord Implementation
Group (AIG) developed these principles in close coordination with the Committee's
Risk Management Group.
The principles that follow are intended to be broadly
compatible with the rules laid out in the Third Consultative Document. However,
it is clear that specific enabling language will have to be introduced to the
Accord to permit the hybrid approach within Pillar 1. To that end, the Committee
is considering the text provided as an attachment to this paper. http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs106.pdf The Application of Basel II to Trading Activities
and the Treatment of Double Default Effects The
efforts of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) to revise the standards
governing the capital adequacy of internationally active banks achieved a critical
milestone in the publication of an agreed text in June 2004. The International
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework2
describes a more comprehensive measure and minimum standard for capital adequacy
that national supervisory authorities represented on the BCBS are now working
to implement through domestic rule-making and adoption procedures.
The
"Basel II" framework, or Revised Framework, as the new standard is frequently
called, seeks to improve on the existing rules by aligning regulatory capital
requirements more closely to the underlying risks that banks face. In addition,
the Revised Framework is intended to promote a more forward-looking approach to
capital supervision, one that encourages banks to identify the risks they may
face, today and in the future, and to develop or improve their ability to manage
those risks. As a result, the Revised Framework is intended to be more flexible
and better able to evolve with advances in markets and risk management practices.
In
releasing the Revised Framework last summer, the BCBS re-iterated its intention
to maintain its active dialogue with the industry to ensure that the new framework
keeps pace with, and can be applied to, ongoing developments in the financial
services sector. Two areas that the BCBS identified where immediate work should
be done concerned (1) finding a prudentially sound treatment under the Revised
Framework for exposures to "double default," where the risk of both a borrower
and a guarantor defaulting on the same obligation may be substantially lower than
the risk of only one of the parties defaulting; and (2) applying the Revised Framework
to certain exposures arising from trading activities.
Given the interest
of both banks and securities firms in the potential solutions to these particular
issues, the BCBS has worked jointly with the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) to consult with industry representatives and other supervisors
on these matters. This paper describes a proposal to address five specific issues
related to double default and trading activities prior to the implementation of
the Revised Framework. These issues consist of the following: - the
treatment of counterparty credit risk for over-the-counter derivatives, repo-style
and securities financing transactions; and the treatment of cross-product netting
arrangements;
- the
treatment of double-default effects for covered transactions;
- the
short-term maturity adjustment, in the internal ratings-based approach;
- improvements
to the current trading book regime, especially with respect to the treatment of
specific risk; and
- the
design of a specific capital treatment for failed transactions and transactions
that are not settled through a delivery-versus-payment framework (non-DvP).
While
this work was undertaken jointly by working groups from the BCBS and IOSCO, the
resulting proposal represents an effort by the BCBS to find prudential treatments
for certain exposures held by banks under the new capital standards outlined in
the Revised Framework. Consequently, this text frequently refers to rules for
"banks", banking groups, and other firms subject to prudential banking regulations.
The BCBS recognises that, in some cases, national authorities may decide to apply
these rules not just to banks and banking groups, but also to investment firms
or to combined groups of banks and investment firms. In such cases, national authorities
may additionally wish to apply the treatments specified in this proposal to investment
firms, to groups of investment firms, and to combined groups of banks and investment
firms that are subject to prudential banking or securities regulation.
The
BCBS released a first version of this proposal in April 2005, for consultation
purposes. Thirty-seven comments have been provided by banks, investment firms,
industry associations, supervisory authorities, and other interested institutions.
The BCBS and IOSCO wish to thank representatives of the industry for their fruitful
comments. The BCBS and IOSCO worked diligently, in close cooperation with representatives
of the industry, to reflect their comments in the present paper. http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs116.pdf Implementation of Basel II: Practical Considerations In
June 2004, the Committee published the document "International Convergence of
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, a Revised Framework" (widely known
as Basel II). While this revised Framework has been designed to provide options
for banks and banking systems world-wide, the Committee acknowledges that moving
towards its adoption in the near future may not be the first priority for all
supervisors in all non-G10 countries in terms of what is needed to strengthen
their supervision. Furthermore, the IMF and World Bank are of the view that future
financial sector assessments will not be conducted on the basis of adoption of
or compliance with the revised Framework if a country has not chosen to implement
it. Rather, assessments will be based on the adequacy of the regulatory/supervisory
standards adopted by the respective country and the country's performance relative
to the chosen standards, consistent with the requirements of the Basel Committee's
Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision ("BCP, September 1997").
Basel
II aims to build on a solid foundation of prudent capital regulation, supervision,
and market discipline, and to enhance further risk management and financial stability.
As such, the Committee encourages each national supervisor to consider carefully
the benefits of the new Framework in the context of its own domestic banking system
and in developing a timetable and approach to implementation. Given resource and
other constraints, these plans may extend beyond the Committee's implementation
dates. That said, supervisors should consider implementing key elements of the
supervisory review and market discipline components of the new Framework even
if the Basel II minimum capital requirements are not fully implemented by the
implementation date. National supervisors should also ensure that banks that do
not implement Basel II are subject to prudent capital regulation and sound accounting
and provisioning policies.
Many national supervisors who are not represented
in the Committee have already begun to evaluate the suitability of the new Framework
for banks in their jurisdiction and plan for the transition to Basel II. In order
to further this process, the Committee convened a Working Group largely comprised
of members from non-G10 countries to assess the issues involved in implementing
Basel II, to help them decide whether and when to implement Basel II, and to provide
practical suggestions to supervisors for the transition to the new Framework.
The Working Group undertook this work during the first half of 2003. A number
of those suggestions are summarised in this discussion document. Although the
document has been largely informed by the experiences of the particular members
of the Working Group, the guidance is not focused on any country or particular
type of banking system. Rather, the document offers suggestions that can be adapted
for use in different jurisdictions; it may also serve as a basis for discussion
between supervisors and the banking industry. The document is not intended to
be an interpretation of Basel II rules.
The document is structured as follows.
Section 1 sets out various policy considerations that can play a role in weighing
the costs and benefits of Basel II implementation vis-à-vis other national priorities.
Section 2 discusses the factors that could be considered in determining the application
of Basel II, with regard to the particular options and the population of banks
which would be subject to the new Framework. Sections 3, 4 and 5 discuss implementation
of Pillars 1, 2 and 3 more specifically. Sections 6 and 7 address potential changes
to the legal and regulatory framework and resource and training needs. http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs109.pdf
Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate market
risks
This
document, commonly referred to as the Market Risk Amendment, represents the main
section of a three-part package of documents issued by the Basel Committee to
amend the Capital Accord of July 1988 to take account of and set capital requirements
for market risks. It describes two alternative approaches to the measurement of
market risk, a standardised method and an internal models approach, closing with
a number of worked examples. The other papers in the three-part package are an
overview of the market risk amendment and a technical paper on the backtesting
of models.
This document, commonly referred to as the Market Risk Amendment,
represents the main section of a three-part package of documents issued by the
Basel Committee to amend the Capital Accord of July 1988 to take account of and
set capital requirements for market risks. It describes two alternative approaches
to the measurement of market risk, a standardised method and an internal models
approach, closing with a number of worked examples. The other papers in the three-part
package are an overview of the market risk amendment and a technical paper on
the backtesting of models.
Originally released in January 1996 and modified
in September 1997, the Amendment was further revised on 14 November 2005 to incorporate
the Basel Committee's 18 July 2005 paper, The application of Basel II to trading
activities and the treatment of double default effects, solely as a matter of
convenience to readers. This paper, which was prepared by a joint working group
of the Basel Committee and the International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO), sets forth capital requirements for banks' exposures to certain trading-related
activities, including counterparty credit risk, and for the treatment of double
default effects, or the risk that both a borrower and guarantor default on the
same obligation. These requirements have been reflected into the appropriate sections
of the Market Risk Amendment. http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs119.pdf
| |

Basel II publications from BIS
Guidance on the estimation of loss given default
(Paragraph 468 of the Framework Document) Following
publication of "International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards:
A Revised Framework" (the Basel II Framework Document) in June 2004, a number
of interested parties including industry associations and national supervisors
asked the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Committee) to provide further
clarification surrounding the quantification of loss-given-default (LGD) parameters
used for Pillar 1 capital calculations. In particular, the Committee was asked
to further elaborate on the so-called "downturn LGD" standard described in paragraph
468 of the Framework Document. This paragraph requires that estimated LGD parameters
must "reflect economic downturn conditions where necessary to capture the relevant
risks." The same paragraph indicates that "supervisors will continue to monitor
and encourage appropriate approaches to this issue." The LGD Working Group (the
Working Group) was established in September 2004 to engage in a dialogue with
industry concerning appropriate approaches to meeting the requirements of paragraph
468 and to determine whether it would be useful for the Committee to provide further
guidance to industry and supervisors in this area.
Over the last several
months, the Working Group has surveyed practitioner and academic research, national
supervisors represented on the Working Group have held bilateral discussions with
their banks, and the Working Group as a whole has met with a number of banks and
industry associations. The following three findings have been drawn from this
work. First, the potential for realised recovery rates to be lower than average
during times of high default rates may be a material source of unexpected credit
losses for some exposures or portfolios. Failing to account for this possibility
risks understating the capital required to cover unexpected losses. Second, data
limitations pose an important challenge to the estimation of LGD parameters in
general, and of LGD parameters consistent with economic downturn conditions in
particular. Third, there is currently little consensus within the banking industry
with respect to appropriate methods for incorporating downturn conditions in LGD
estimates. A significant body of academic and practitioner research on this issue
has developed that shows a range of results concerning the potential impact of
downturn conditions on LGDs. The extent and manner by which potential dependencies
between default rates and recovery rates are reflected in internal economic capital
models varies considerably across institutions.
Given these findings, the
Committee has determined that a principles-based approach to elaborating on the
requirements of paragraph 468 is most appropriate at this time. This approach
is intended to ensure that banks have systems in place for identifying downturn
conditions and for incorporating these conditions into LGD estimates where appropriate.
The principles articulated in this document are designed to be flexible enough
to allow for a range of sound practices and to encourage continued work in this
area, while also clarifying the Committee's expectations. These principles are
not intended to amend the Revised Framework or to introduce any new rules. The
Committee will continue to monitor industry practice through the Accord Implementation
Group and may provide additional guidance as industry practices evolve.
This
document is organised into six sections. Section I defines terms used throughout
this document. Section II articulates a principle for the quantification of LGD
parameters consistent with paragraph 468 of the Framework Document. Section III
discusses a principle for discounting recovery cash flows used in LGD estimation.
Section IV discusses the possibility that for validation purposes supervisors
may request that banks provide supplemental information on the average loss rate
given default for some exposures. Section V provides guidance to supervisors concerning
the development of fallback solutions that might be permitted on a transitional
basis in circumstances where banks cannot satisfy the principle articulated in
Section II. Section VI clarifies the relationship between the LGD quantification
requirements in paragraph 468 and stress testing requirements discussed in paragraphs
434 and 435 of the Framework Document. http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs115.pdf
Home-host information sharing for effective Basel
II implementation This
paper is being issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in
association with the Core Principles Liaison Group (CPLG), a BCBS working group
which includes representatives from sixteen non-BCBS jurisdictions. It addresses
the question of information-sharing between home and host supervisors under the
new Capital Framework known as Basel II). The paper is confined to Basel II implementation
and does not address wider information sharing issues, since the implementation
of Basel II is considered a priority in the short-term. However, work undertaken
in the context of Basel II may help prepare the way for broader guidance in the
future that addresses additional aspects of home-host cooperation, should that
be considered beneficial.
The need to develop cross-border understandings
on the application of capital standards to international banking groups is recognised
as an essential element of the successful implementation of Basel II. In this
respect, the BCBS has over the past few months been encouraging the home and host
supervisors of the major international banking groups to discuss among themselves,
and with the institutions that they supervise, the implementation of Basel II.
These discussions have progressed to the stage where a number of preliminary decisions
are being considered with regard to the ongoing supervision of individual banking
groups, whether through bilateral or multilateral arrangements. It is important
that these group implementation studies continue to make progress in the coming
months and that home and host authorities build on the working relationships that
are being developed to create effective cooperative mechanisms.
These discussions
have confirmed the need to develop more robust information-sharing arrangements
between home and host supervisors as set out in High-level principles for the
cross-border implementation of the New Accord. Creating a framework for supervisory
cooperation has been an objective of the BCBS since its creation, which it has
promoted through the issue of successive principles governing cross-border supervision
(starting from the 1975 Concordat) and more recently through its Core Principles
for Effective Banking Supervision and the subsequent Methodology. A key feature
of this framework is that international banking groups need to be supervised on
a consolidated basis, covering all aspects of the business, domestic and cross-border.
Consolidated supervision of international banking groups requires effective co-operation
and information exchange between home supervisors and host supervisors and it
is hoped that improvements in this area will be one of the side-effects of Basel
II.
While communication between home and host supervisors is important,
banks have the primary role to play in implementing Basel II and in providing
relevant information to home and host supervisors to allow them to meet their
responsibilities. In particular, as is stressed in paragraph 14 of this paper,
the local managers of foreign branches and subsidiaries need to be kept informed
of the steps that are being taken at group level to manage group capital and of
the decision to adopt one or other option under Basel II. In this regard, Basel
II does not diminish the legal or governance responsibilities of subsidiary bank
management within the group structure. http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs120.pdf
Basel II: International Convergence of Capital Measurement
and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework 1.
This report presents the outcome of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision's
("the Committee") work over recent years to secure international convergence on
revisions to supervisory regulations governing the capital adequacy of internationally
active banks. Following the publication of the Committee's first round of proposals
for revising the capital adequacy framework in June 1999, an extensive consultative
process was set in train in all member countries and the proposals were also circulated
to supervisory authorities worldwide. The Committee subsequently released additional
proposals for consultation in January 2001 and April 2003 and furthermore conducted
three quantitative impact studies related to its proposals. As a result of these
efforts, many valuable improvements have been made to the original proposals.
The present paper is now a statement of the Committee agreed by all its members.
It sets out the details of the agreed Framework for measuring capital adequacy
and the minimum standard to be achieved which the national supervisory authorities
represented on the Committee will propose for adoption in their respective countries.
This Framework and the standard it contains have been endorsed by the Central
Bank Governors and Heads of Banking Supervision of the Group of Ten countries.
2.
The Committee expects its members to move forward with the appropriate adoption
procedures in their respective countries. In a number of instances, these procedures
will include additional impact assessments of the Committee's Framework as well
as further opportunities for comments by interested parties to be provided to
national authorities. The Committee intends the Framework set out here to be available
for implementation as of yearend 2006. However, the Committee feels that one further
year of impact studies or parallel calculations will be needed for the most advanced
approaches, and these therefore will be available for implementation as of year-end
2007. More details on the transition to the revised Framework and its relevance
to particular approaches are set out in paragraphs 45 to 49.
3. This document
is being circulated to supervisory authorities worldwide with a view to encouraging
them to consider adopting this revised Framework at such time as they believe
is consistent with their broader supervisory priorities. While the revised Framework
has been designed to provide options for banks and banking systems worldwide,
the Committee acknowledges that moving toward its adoption in the near future
may not be a first priority for all non-G10 supervisory authorities in terms of
what is needed to strengthen their supervision. Where this is the case, each national
supervisor should consider carefully the benefits of the revised Framework in
the context of its domestic banking system when developing a timetable and approach
to implementation.
4. The fundamental objective of the Committee's work
to revise the 1988 Accord has been to develop a framework that would further strengthen
the soundness and stability of the international banking system while maintaining
sufficient consistency that capital adequacy regulation will not be a significant
source of competitive inequality among internationally active banks. The Committee
believes that the revised Framework will promote the adoption of stronger risk
management practices by the banking industry, and views this as one of its major
benefits. The Committee notes that, in their comments on the proposals, banks
and other interested parties have welcomed the concept and rationale of the three
pillars (minimum capital requirements, supervisory review, and market discipline)
approach on which the revised Framework is based. More generally, they have expressed
support for improving capital regulation to take into account changes in banking
and risk management practices while at the same time preserving the benefits of
a framework that can be applied as uniformly as possible at the national level.
5.
In developing the revised Framework, the Committee has sought to arrive at significantly
more risk-sensitive capital requirements that are conceptually sound and at the
same time pay due regard to particular features of the present supervisory and
accounting systems in individual member countries. It believes that this objective
has been achieved. The Committee is also retaining key elements of the 1988 capital
adequacy framework, including the general requirement for banks to hold total
capital equivalent to at least 8% of their risk-weighted assets; the basic structure
of the 1996 Market Risk Amendment regarding the treatment of market risk; and
the definition of eligible capital.
6. A significant innovation of the
revised Framework is the greater use of assessments of risk provided by banks'
internal systems as inputs to capital calculations. In taking this step, the Committee
is also putting forward a detailed set of minimum requirements designed to ensure
the integrity of these internal risk assessments. It is not the Committee's intention
to dictate the form or operational detail of banks' risk management policies and
practices. Each supervisor will develop a set of review procedures for ensuring
that banks' systems and controls are adequate to serve as the basis for the capital
calculations. Supervisors will need to exercise sound judgements when determining
a bank's state of readiness, particularly during the implementation process. The
Committee expects national supervisors will focus on compliance with the minimum
requirements as a means of ensuring the overall integrity of a bank's ability
to provide prudential inputs to the capital calculations and not as an end in
itself.
7. The revised Framework provides a range of options for determining
the capital requirements for credit risk and operational risk to allow banks and
supervisors to select approaches that are most appropriate for their operations
and their financial market infrastructure. In addition, the Framework also allows
for a limited degree of national discretion in the way in which each of these
options may be applied, to adapt the standards to different conditions of national
markets. These features, however, will necessitate substantial efforts by national
authorities to ensure sufficient consistency in application. The Committee intends
to monitor and review the application of the Framework in the period ahead with
a view to achieving even greater consistency. In particular, its Accord Implementation
Group (AIG) was established to promote consistency in the Framework's application
by encouraging supervisors to exchange information on implementation approaches.
8.
The Committee has also recognised that home country supervisors have an important
role in leading the enhanced cooperation between home and host country supervisors
that will be required for effective implementation. The AIG is developing practical
arrangements for cooperation and coordination that reduce implementation burden
on banks and conserve supervisory resources. Based on the work of the AIG, and
based on its interactions with supervisors and the industry, the Committee has
issued general principles for the cross-border implementation of the revised Framework
and more focused principles for the recognition of operational risk capital charges
under advanced measurement approaches for home and host supervisors.
9.
It should be stressed that the revised Framework is designed to establish minimum
levels of capital for internationally active banks. As under the 1988 Accord,
national authorities will be free to adopt arrangements that set higher levels
of minimum capital. Moreover, they are free to put in place supplementary measures
of capital adequacy for the banking organisations they charter. National authorities
may use a supplementary capital measure as a way to address, for example, the
potential uncertainties in the accuracy of the measure of risk exposures inherent
in any capital rule or to constrain the extent to which an organisation may fund
itself with debt. Where a jurisdiction employs a supplementary capital measure
(such as a leverage ratio or a large exposure limit) in conjunction with the measure
set forth in this Framework, in some instances the capital required under the
supplementary measure may be more binding. More generally, under the second pillar,
supervisors should expect banks to operate above minimum regulatory capital levels.
10.
The revised Framework is more risk sensitive than the 1988 Accord, but countries
where risks in the local banking market are relatively high nonetheless need to
consider if banks should be required to hold additional capital over and above
the Basel minimum. This is particularly the case with the more broad brush standardised
approach, but, even in the case of the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach,
the risk of major loss events may be higher than allowed for in this Framework.
11.
The Committee also wishes to highlight the need for banks and supervisors to give
appropriate attention to the second (supervisory review) and third (market discipline)
pillars of the revised Framework. It is critical that the minimum capital requirements
of the first pillar be accompanied by a robust implementation of the second, including
efforts by banks to assess their capital adequacy and by supervisors to review
such assessments. In addition, the disclosures provided under the third pillar
of this Framework will be essential in ensuring that market discipline is an effective
complement to the other two pillars.
12. The Committee is aware that interactions
between regulatory and accounting approaches at both the national and international
level can have significant consequences for the comparability of the resulting
measures of capital adequacy and for the costs associated with the implementation
of these approaches. The Committee believes that its decisions with respect to
unexpected and expected losses represent a major step forward in this regard.
The Committee and its members intend to continue playing a pro-active role in
the dialogue with accounting authorities in an effort to reduce, wherever possible,
inappropriate disparities between regulatory and accounting standards.
13.
The revised Framework presented here reflects several significant changes relative
to the Committee's most recent consultative proposal in April 2003. A number of
these changes have already been described in the Committee's press statements
of October 2003, January 2004 and May 2004. These include the changes in the approach
to the treatment of expected losses (EL) and unexpected losses (UL) and to the
treatment of securitisation exposures. In addition to these, changes in the treatments
of credit risk mitigation and qualifying revolving retail exposures, among others,
are also being incorporated. The Committee also has sought to clarify its expectations
regarding the need for banks using the advanced IRB approach to incorporate the
effects arising from economic downturns into their loss-given-default (LGD) parameters.
14.
The Committee believes it is important to reiterate its objectives regarding the
overall level of minimum capital requirements. These are to broadly maintain the
aggregate level of such requirements, while also providing incentives to adopt
the more advanced risk-sensitive approaches of the revised Framework. The Committee
has confirmed the need to further review the calibration of the revised Framework
prior to its implementation. Should the information available at the time of such
review reveal that the Committee's objectives on overall capital would not be
achieved, the Committee is prepared to take actions necessary to address the situation.
In particular, and consistent with the principle that such actions should be separated
from the design of the Framework itself, this would entail the application of
a single scaling factor — which could be either greater than or less than one
— to the IRB capital requirement resulting from the revised Framework. The current
best estimate of the scaling factor using Quantitative Impact Study 3 data adjusted
for the EL-UL decisions is 1.06. The final determination of any scaling factor
will be based on the parallel running results, which will reflect all of the elements
of the Framework to be implemented.
15. The Committee has designed the
revised Framework to be a more forward-looking approach to capital adequacy supervision,
one that has the capacity to evolve with time. This evolution is necessary to
ensure that the Framework keeps pace with market developments and advances in
risk management practices, and the Committee intends to monitor these developments
and to make revisions when necessary. In this regard, the Committee has benefited
greatly from its frequent interactions with industry participants and looks forward
to enhanced opportunities for dialogue. The Committee also intends to keep the
industry apprised of its future work agenda.
16. In July 2005, the Committee
published additional guidance in the document The Application of Basel II to Treading
Activities and the Treatment of Double Default Effects . That guidance was developed
jointly with the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO)
and demonstrates the capacity of the revised Framework to evolve with time. It
refined the treatments of counterparty credit risk, double default effects, shortterm
maturity adjustment and failed transactions, and improved the trading book regime.
17.
One area where the Committee intends to undertake additional work of a longerterm
nature is in relation to the definition of eligible capital. One motivation for
this is the fact that the changes in the treatment of expected and unexpected
losses and related changes in the treatment of provisions in the Framework set
out here generally tend to reduce Tier 1 capital requirements relative to total
capital requirements. Moreover, converging on a uniform international capital
standard under this Framework will ultimately require the identification of an
agreed set of capital instruments that are available to absorb unanticipated losses
on a going-concern basis. The Committee announced its intention to review the
definition of capital as a follow-up to the revised approach to Tier 1 eligibility
as announced in its October 1998 press release, "Instruments eligible for inclusion
in Tier 1 capital". It will explore further issues surrounding the definition
of regulatory capital, but does not intend to propose changes as a result of this
longer-term review prior to the implementation of the revised Framework set out
in this document. In the meantime, the Committee will continue its efforts to
ensure the consistent application of its 1998 decisions regarding the composition
of regulatory capital across jurisdictions.
18. The Committee also seeks
to continue to engage the banking industry in a discussion of prevailing risk
management practices, including those practices aiming to produce quantified measures
of risk and economic capital. Over the last decade, a number of banking organisations
have invested resources in modelling the credit risk arising from their significant
business operations. Such models are intended to assist banks in quantifying,
aggregating and managing credit risk across geographic and product lines. While
the Framework presented in this document stops short of allowing the results of
such credit risk models to be used for regulatory capital purposes, the Committee
recognises the importance of continued active dialogue regarding both the performance
of such models and their comparability across banks. Moreover, the Committee believes
that a successful implementation of the revised Framework will provide banks and
supervisors with critical experience necessary to address such challenges. The
Committee understands that the IRB approach represents a point on the continuum
between purely regulatory measures of credit risk and an approach that builds
more fully on internal credit risk models. In principle, further movements along
that continuum are foreseeable, subject to an ability to address adequately concerns
about reliability, comparability, validation, and competitive equity. In the meantime,
the Committee believes that additional attention to the results of internal credit
risk models in the supervisory review process and in banks' disclosures will be
highly beneficial for the accumulation of information on the relevant issues.
19.
This document is divided into four parts as illustrated in the following chart.
The first part, scope of application, details how the capital requirements are
to be applied within a banking group. Calculation of the minimum capital requirements
for credit risk and operational risk, as well as certain trading book issues are
provided in part two. The third and fourth parts outline expectations concerning
supervisory review and market discipline, respectively.
19(i). This updated
version of the revised Framework, which was initially released in June 2004, incorporates
the additional guidance set forth in the Committee's paper The Application of
Basel II to Trading Activities and the Treatment of Double Default Effects (July
2005). The Amendment to the Capital Accord to incorporate Market Risks (January
1996) has also been updated to reflect the changes introduced by the revised Framework
and the above-mentioned document. http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs118.pdf
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